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This court will find that clear error exists only if the factual findings made 
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P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However, this court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936; accord 
State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991). 
This Court also has stated: 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we 
will not overturn [its] factual findings absent clear error. The trial court's legal 
conclusions, however, we review for correctness. State v. Navanick. 1999 UT 
App 265, f^ 7, 987 P.2d 1276 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
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public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant. ) 
vs. 
TIM KELLY BENCH, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
> BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
[ Case No. 20060929-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 12, 2005, Mr. Bench's vehicle was stopped by Salt Lake City 
Police Officer Justin Hudson at 9:45 p.m. Officer Hudson testified at a Motion to 
Suppress Hearing in Third District Court that he overheard a call on the radio 
dispatch regarding a male reported as possibly driving while intoxicated. R. 130 
at 11, 15. (The transcript of the officer's testimony and the trial court's decision 
is contained at Addendum A.) Hudson R. 130 at 15. The officer testified on 
direct examination that the information he received from dispatch was that an ex-
wife had called the police and stated that a male had transported children while 
intoxicated. R. 109; R. 130 at l l . 1 
1
 On cross examination the officer agreed that the ex-wife had called and said the 
ex-husband had dropped off the kids and that she thought he might be intoxicated. 
R. 130 at 15. 
1 
The officer testified that the radio dispatch report contained the ex-
husband's name, his address, the description and license plate of the vehicle. R. 
130 at 11, 15. No information about the basis of the belief that the ex-husband 
might be intoxicated was provided over the dispatch. R. 130 at 15. Officer 
Hudson indicated that he was not on call at the time, nor was he looking for the 
vehicle when he observed a vehicle matching the description of the reported 
vehicle. He made a u-turn and followed the vehicle for two blocks. R. 130 at 13, 
19. The officer testified that once he began to follow the vehicle, the vehicle 
slowed down to 25 miles per hour (10 miles per hour below the speed limit of 35) 
and then subsequently signaled for a lane change for 5 seconds (two seconds more 
than the minimum required signal time of three seconds). R. 130 at 13. 
The officer further testified that despite no traffic violation, the driver's 
reduction in speed, made the officer suspicious about his impairment and together 
with the dispatch report supported his decision to make a traffic stop. R. 130 at 
13-14,20-21. 
On cross examination the officer conceded that he did not observe the 
driver violate any traffic law nor did he observe any equipment violation on the 
vehicle. R. 130 at 19. 
The officer arrested Mr. Bench for Driving under the Influence. Counsel 
for Mr. Bench filed, inter alia, a Motion to Suppress Based on Lack of Reasonable 
Suspicion to Initiate Traffic Stop. R. 63-67. The evidentiary hearing consisting 
of the above testimony of the officer was held on June 20, 2006, where the City's 
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only witness was the officer. R. 130. The ex-wife who made the call providing 
the information to the police was subpoenaed but was not called and did not 
testify. R. 49; R. 130. 
The trial court granted the Motion to Suppress and directed that findings of 
fact and conclusions of law be prepared with specific directions to include that the 
traffic concerns did not support a basis to justify the stop and that under a totality 
of the circumstances analysis, together with the dispatch call did not provide 
enough information to support the stop due to a lack of detail and description 
provided. R. 108-112; R. 130 at 26-28. (The trial Court's Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law are found in Addendum B.) 
This appeal by the City followed. R. 113-114. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The order of the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, Third Judicial District Court 
Judge, to suppress the evidence obtained in this case in violation of constitutional 
safeguards should be affirmed on appeal. In this case Salt Lake City failed to meet 
its burden to establish reasonable articulable suspicion that the stop of Mr. 
Bench's vehicle was within Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements. 
Police Officer Hudson relied on a police dispatch call based on an ex-wife's 
unsubstantiated claim that Mr. Bench had transported the children while 
intoxicated. 
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The officer's reliance on the dispatch call originating from the ex-wife 
informant also was fatally flawed as the City was unable to establish the informant 
as a reliable tipster. The ex-wife informant provided insufficient detail of 
observed criminal activity and the officer also failed to independently corroborate 
a crime through personal observation as required by the constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SALT LAKE CITY 
FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO SHOW THAT 
THE DISPATCH RELAYING THE INFORMANT'S TIP WAS BASED ON 
REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
Based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and well-established case authority interpreting these rights, the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving that an officer had a sufficient basis to 
support an investigatory stop. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah App. 
1994); State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1994). 
At a minimum, an officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe that a 
driver has committed or is committing a traffic or criminal offense before lawfully 
affecting the stop of a driver. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts 
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of 
the stop. 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(this standard also has been 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended)). 
4 
The Lopez Court established constitutional reasonableness for a traffic stop 
as permissible only if made (1) incident to a violation committed in the officer's 
presence, or (2) if the officer can articulate sufficient suspicion—based on 
reason—that the driver is committing a traffic offense or is otherwise engaged in 
more serious criminal activity. Id. Without a minimum of reasonable articulable 
suspicion an officer may not legally stop a vehicle or detain its occupants. 
Whenever an officer affects a stop for an alleged offense committed outside 
of his presence, the stop must be evaluated objectively. State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 
1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988). Such an evaluation requires a determination 
"whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which fairly 
might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position would 
be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense." State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996). These requirements ensure that the 
stop is reasonable at inception consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1968). 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires that the standards applied to the 
review of a warrantless arrest are at least as stringent as the standards applied to a 
magistrate's assessment of the facts when issuing a warrant. State v. Valenzuela, 
37 P.3d 260, If 10, n. 2 (Utah App. 2001)(quotmg Whitelev v. Warden, Wyoming 
State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971). 
Whiteley is instructive in this case because it reminds that while reliance 
on police bulletins or dispatch is permissible, the underlying basis of the 
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dispatch is subject to judicial review and must independently provide a 
constitutional basis. Whitelev, 401 U.S. 560, 567-68 (ruling that an otherwise 
illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the 
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make an arrest where the initial 
information is without the sufficient supporting detail and the arresting officer 
supplies no corroborative details). The Whiteley Court concluded that petitioner 
Whiteley's arrest "violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments; the evidence secured as an incident thereto should 
have been excluded from his trial." Id. at 569. (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). 
This Court has ruled that where the prosecution predicates its justification 
for a warrantless intrusion on an informant's tip an examination must be 
performed into the "totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 
informant's tip, together with police observations, provide probable cause [or as in 
this case reasonable articulable suspicion]." State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.2d 260 at ]f 
11 (citing Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983)). This Court also has stated: 
This inquiry involves 'a practical, common-sense decision whether, given 
all the circumstances ..., including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" 
of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that... 
evidence of a crime will be found. 
Id (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). In Valenzuela this Court stated that "fain 
officer receiving a dispatched message 'may take it at face value and act on it 
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forthwith.' " Id at TJ14 (quoting State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 n. 5 (Utah 
App. 1994)). However, this Court cautioned: 
[I]f the investigation results in an arrest and the defendant objects to the 
legality of the initial investigatory detention, the [prosecution] is required 
to establish that adequate articulable suspicion initially spurred the 
dispatch. To do so, the [prosecution] must show that the dispatch relaying 
the informant's tip was based on reasonable suspicion, which requires the 
reviewing court to probe the reliability and sufficiency of the informant's 
tip. 
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
This Court articulated a three factor analysis in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 
943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), to assist this practical, common-sense inquiry in 
determining the reliability and sufficiency of the informant's report. Four years 
later in Valenzuela this Court reviewed and applied those factors in a scenario 
analytically helpful to this case at bar. The three factors are as follows: 
Our first focus is upon the type of tip or informant involved, granting 
identified informants substantially more credibility than anonymous 
informants. Next, we examine whether the informant gave enough detail 
about the observed criminal activity to support a seizure, and concluded that 
a tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant observed the details 
personally, instead of relaying information from a third party. Finally, we 
examine whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip, noting that an officer can 
corroborate the information either by observing the illegal activity, or by 
finding the person, and the other material facts substantially as described by 
the informant. Moreover, while we stated that where the reliability of the 
information is increased, less corroboration is necessary, we also established 
that absent a risk to public safety we expect police officers to make 
significant independent corroborative efforts to confirm the information. 
Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 at f 15 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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Examining these three factors in this case of Mr. Bench, the district court's 
decision to grant the Motion to Suppress is inarguably both factually and legally 
correct. This Court should affirm the trial court's decision that the stop was 
violative of Fourth Amendment strictures. 
The first factor: type of tip or informant. 
The informant in this case is an ex-wife of the suspect who placed her call 
to the police after a former husband returned children to her at or before 9:30 in 
the evening. While this informant is identified by role, no testimony was provided 
at the hearing about her name or her address. Additionally, her role in the matter 
is not consistent with a presumption of reliability. Appreciating a bias against an 
ex-wife is both practical and reasonable to presume through a common-sense 
analysis. For example, the Utah Supreme Court found it noteworthy to comment 
in another informant case that the police department in that case had questions 
about the veracity and reliability of an ex-paramour who was presenting as an 
informant until the very same tip reached the police from an independent source 
the following day. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233. When children are involved in a 
relationship between former spouses, it is not uncommon for ex-spouses to 
experience conflict and to demonstrate hard feelings for one another. Such strong 
feelings too often can result in criminal allegations created by one spouse about 
the other spouse. 
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The City's failure to call the ex-spouse informant as a witness is fatal to its 
claim that the court erred in granting Mr. Bench's Motion to Suppress for lack of 
reasonable articulable suspicion. As stated above, identified informants are given 
more credibility than those unidentified. Here, although somewhat identified, the 
informant did not appear and testify for the court to evaluate her credibility or to 
discern whether any actual bias did or did not exist in this matter. The court's 
determination that the City did not meet its burden on this factor is reasonable and 
should not be disturbed. 
Factor one balances in favor of the conclusion that the information (or lack 
thereof) provided by this informant was neither reliable nor sufficient to justify the 
officer's stop. 
The second factor: whether the informant gave enough detail about the 
observed criminal activity. 
Here, in factor two, the informant is entitled to little to no reliability. 
Likewise, the informant's information is insufficient to justify a stop. The 
informant ex-wife provided only a conclusory statement to the dispatch, or at least 
dispatch provided only a conclusory allegation from the informant to the detaining 
officer. Fatal to the City's case, in this factor, again is the failure of the 
prosecution to introduce any evidence establishing the basis of the informant's 
belief and tip that Mr. Bench either was or might have been intoxicated. 
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The tip itself is worthy of scrutiny as the officer testified only that the ex-
wife asserted that her ex-husband had dropped off the kids and that she thought he 
was intoxicated. R. 130 at 11. No supporting detail "about the observed criminal 
activity" was provided: No odor of alcohol. No slurred speech. No stumbling or 
falling down. 
This Court has indicated that a tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the 
informant observed the details personally, instead of relaying information from a 
third party. Here, however, the tip only contains detail about Mr. Beach's name, 
vehicle and license plate. While some of that information, such as the plate, is 
indeed detailed, none of that detail is incriminating. The assertion that he either 
was or may have been impaired is without any detail whatsoever and should not be 
considered reliable or credible. 
In both, Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 and St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 
(Utah App. 1987), the Court, while utilizing the three factor test discussed herein, 
indicated that the informant who tips police that a drunk driver is on the road need 
not give details as to why he or she believes the driver is drunk. However, in the 
analysis of these factors the Court acknowledged that not all tips are of equal value 
establishing reasonable suspicion. Id. at 235. Perhaps, more importantly, the 
Court reminded that the burden to establish sufficient articulable facts is on the 
prosecution and that while the officer may act on the face value of that tip, that 
once challenged the prosecution must—albeit after the fact—establish that 
adequate articulable suspicion spurred the dispatch. Id. at 234. Furthermore, the 
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court explained that those tips that are not anonymous are typically higher on the 
reliability scale because a known informant "makes it possible for the police to 
verify the facts underlying the report." Id. at 235-36 (quoting State v. Roth, 827 
P.2d 255, 258 (Utah App. 1992)). 
Contrary to the City's claim that more detail exists here than in both 
Mulcahy and Carter, the detail provided here, unlike those cases, does not point to 
the specific criminal activity of intoxication and is insufficient to support the after-
the-fact analysis that Mulcahy explained is required under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis. In both Mulcahy and Carter we know, either from their testimony at the 
hearing or the details provided in the dispatch report, that the witnesses there had 
names, addresses and direct face to face contact with the suspect. In Mulcahy the 
defendant was described as a drunk individual who had been on the tipster's 
porch, 943 P.2d at 233; in Carter the defendant had been at the tipster's fast food 
drive-through window where the witness personally observed and reported an 
open container violation, including watching the suspect drink from and not 
discard the beer can, 945 P.2d at 167. 
In Mr. Bench's case the City did not produce any after-the-fact testimony 
from either the police or the witness. The evidence is free from any detail whether 
the tipster herself saw or spoke to Mr. Bench. The information she provided was 
even questionable as to whether he was actually intoxicated or just possibly might 
have been. We also do not know for sure exactly when Mr. Bench had dropped 
off the children. Finally, we don't know for sure whether the ex-wife was a first 
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hand observer or provided hearsay information to the police subsequently sent 
over the dispatch. 
This second factor is woefully short on whether the informant gave the 
sufficient detail required to establish criminal activity to sustain the stop of Mr. 
Bench as constitutional. This second factor balances in favor of the trial court's 
ruling finding the police stop violative of Mr. Bench's rights against unlawful 
seizure. 
The third factor: whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip. 
The officer in this case was neither on call nor looking for the target of the 
dispatch when Mr. Bench's vehicle appeared. Officer Hudson made a u-turn and 
then followed Mr. Bench for two blocks before pulling him over. Hudson did not 
see Mr. Bench commit a traffic offense. Nothing about Mr. Bench's driving was 
unlawful. No typical DUI driving pattern, such as running a stop sign, weaving or 
speeding, was observed by the officer. Similarly, no equipment violation was 
observed by Hudson. The traffic activities relied on by the officer to justify 
stopping Mr. Bench, after making his u-turn and following Mr. Bench, was that he 
slowed down to twenty-five miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone and 
that he signaled for five whole seconds rather than just the minimum three 
required by statute. Again, neither event is against the law or in any way 
corroborative of an unsupported assertion that Mr. Bench might be intoxicated. 
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The trial court granted the Motion of Mr. Bench by stating: 
[I]n my mind there's clearly not enough evidence to stop—to pull 
Mr. Bench over based on his driving pattern. 
I mean, if it's not illegal, I mean, if you allow this, then where do 
you stop pulling anybody over for anything? You're driving too legally, 
you know. 
R. 130 at 26; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R108-112. The trial 
court also added its analysis that the dispatch call somewhat broadens the 
question, "but certainly not enough in this case." Id. The trial court directed 
counsel to prepare findings and conclusions that included there was too little in the 
dispatch call and that the lack of detail and description about why she believed he 
was impaired, left the call lacking. R.130 at 28; Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law R. 108-112. 
Simply stated, the officer did not corroborate the assertion of impairment, 
only the vehicle being driven—a non criminal activity. Moreover, the fact the 
officer followed Mr. Bench for two blocks without observing any traffic violation 
dispels the assertion of the City that he was a risk to public safety. Notably, 
without corroboration of the risk to public safety, this Court indicated its desire for 
officers to make significant independent corroboration of the information. 
Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 at Tf 15. Such an independent corroboration did not occur 
here. Notably, Mulcahy disagrees with Mr. Bench's assertion that corroboration 
needs to be of the criminal activity rather than just locating the suspect. 943 P.2d 
at 236. However, the lack of details of the informant's tip in this matter, discussed 
supra, also includes that contrary to Mulcahy and Carter where the suspects' 
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driving directions and street locations were provided in the report, the ex-wife 
only provided information of the vehicle and Mr. Bench's home address. Because 
no information was introduced regarding where the ex-wife lived and/or the 
precise time Mr. Bench dropped off the children, this case is comparatively 
weaker, not stronger as asserted by the City. 
Moreover, this Court's subsequent ruling after Mulcahy noted above in 
Valenzuela, that significant independent corroboration is required without the risk 
to public safety, runs contrary to the remarks in reliance on the non-directive 
authority cited in Mulcahy. Additionally, the officer's testimony regarding 
whether the ex-wife's comments through dispatch are less than certain about 
whether Mr. Bench was intoxicated at all or just possibly may have been. 
This third factor in the analysis, like the two previous factors, balances 
more heavily toward a lack of corroboration of material and essential facts 
supporting reasonable suspicion and urges this Court to affirm the conclusions of 
the trial court. 
The totality of the circumstances analysis. 
Evaluating the three factors detailed above and employing the appropriate 
discretion afforded trial courts in their factual findings, the totality of the 
circumstances in this matter supports the trial court's ruling granting the Motion to 
Suppress. The ex-wife informant is not entitled to the same presumption of the 
other informants reviewed by this Court. Unlike those other informants, she is not 
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without a bias and should be placed low on the reliability scale. Furthermore, the 
ex-wife informant here lacks sufficient detail and personal awareness of the 
asserted criminal behavior as directed by the Valenzuela opinion. The City's 
failure to produce her as a witness to satisfy these concerns is fatal to its appeal. 
The third factor, like the other two, again demonstrates an informant who provided 
insufficient detail for the officer to corroborate with his own observation sufficient 
to satisfy Fourth Amendment concerns. 
The trial court expressly held that the totality of the circumstances in this 
matter established a violation of the Fourth Amendment and justified suppressing 
the evidence as requested by Mr. Bench and as demanded by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). As no clear error exists in the district court's factual findings 
and application of those facts to the law, this Court should affirm the order 
suppressing the evidence as requested by Mr. Bench and ruled on by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bench respectfully requests that 
the Court affirm the trial court's order suppressing the evidence obtained against 
him in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tMs' j^day 
JASON A. S0HATZ, # 9969 
Attorney fo/Mr. Bench, Appellee 
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true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were filed with 
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Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office 
Attn: Aaron W. Flater and Bernadette M. Gomez 
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COURT: Okay. Do you want to call your 
talk about the probable cause to stop. 
of f i 
GOMEZ: I will. State calls Officer Hudson. 
COURT CLERK: Do you solemnly swear to tell 
e truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
THE 
THE 
You 
OMEZ: 
WITNESS: I do. 
COURT: Come and take the stand, please 
may proceed. 
JUSTIN HUDSON, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Officer Hudson, will ycu please state 
the record. 
Officer Justin Hudson. 
Ana wnere do you wcri;? 
What's that? 
Where do ycu \cr ;? 
and 
the 
you G 
spell 
- n -
cer, 
truth, 
od? 
your 
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A. Salt Lake City Police Department. 
Q. And hew long have you worked with the Salt Lake City 
Police Department? 
A. Six years. A little over six years. 
Q. Now, were you on duty on April 12th, 2005? 
A. I was. 
Q. I'm going to go back to ask you a few more questions. 
Did you attend the training academy? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what was that? 
A. The Utah POST Academy. 
Q. And at that academy were you trained on detecting 
impaired drivers? 
A. We were. 
Q. What type of training was that? 
A. They actually brought in people, volunteers, who 
without our knowledge drank different amounts of alcohol; and 
then they brought them in for us to test each one of them, and 
try to determine what type of alcohol content they had in theii 
body before the breath tests. 
Q. Now, besides that alcohol workshop, were you also 
trained to detect impaired drivers by certain patterns of 
driving? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ana what Type of driving patterns would you see in 
- 1 1 
impaired driving? 
A. Simple patterns such as not obeying traffic laws. 
Other patterns such as slow driving, just curious driving when 
an officer is behind them, things of that nature. 
Q. Okay, you said you were on duty on April 12Cn, 2005. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at around 10 p.m. did you conduct a stop? 
A. I conducted a stop at 9:42 p.m., yes. 
Q. And where did you conduct the stop? 
A. I was in the Glendaie area, and I overheard a call on 
the radio in the Rose Park area regarding a male that had just 
— was transporting children while intoxicated. That was the 
report that dispatch gave us. I wasn't on the call. I was 
just patrolling a different area, and they -- on the radio they 
gave us the address where he might be going; and I happened to 
see him driving. 
Q. Was there anything else in the report? I mean, did 
they — you overheard (inaudible) that there was an intoxicated 
person with children in the car? 
A. They just — I got — they gave us that initial 
information. They gave us the vehicle description, the 
person's name, things like that, and then they also said that 
he'd already been there ana left. Thau's basically this --
over a year later, that's all 1 can remember. 
-12-
abouu? 
A. There was a red truck, I believe, a Dodge. 
Q. And were tnere any other details about the vehicle? 
A. I can't recall any others. 
Q. Did they tell you the location the vehicle would be 
traveling? 
A. No, no. They just gave the location that he had 
supposedly lived; and like I said, I wasn't dispatched to the 
call. I was just patrolling a different area of town. 
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, I'm sorry, but could we ask 
the officer to set his report aside unless he's using it, 
specifically being asked to refresh his memory from it? 
THE COURT: Sure. Officer Hudson, you're — you can 
testify as to what you remember. If you need the report to 
refresh your recollection you can use it, but you're not to 
just read from or testify from it. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. BY MS. GOMEZ: Now, with that information that you had, 
can you tell us where you were at when you conducted the stop? 
A. I conducted the stop on Emery Street. That's noi 
where I came in contact with him. 
Q. And where did you come in contact with him? 
A. Approximately I think it was Navajo and California. 
He was aoing eastDound. I was going westbound when I saw him. 
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Is that Salt Lake City jurisdiction? 
Yes, it is. 
Okay, go ahead and describe --
I was just traveling. I wasn't necessarily looking 
, but as I was traveling westbound I saw a truck 
g the description. So I did a U-turn and began to 
the truck and saw the license plate and it was that 
When I turned around and began to follow, the person 
vehicle slowed down about 10 miles an hour under the 
imit. Then signaled for a great deal of time, about 
five seconds or so. Then changed lanes and continued going 
slow, between 20, 25 miles an hour. That's when I tried to --
attempt 
Q. 
as the 
A. 
Q. 
ed the stop them, to California and Emery. 
Okay, I want to ask you a question about that. As far 
25 mile an hour, what is the speed limit on that road? 
It's 35. 
And is slow driving, is that an indicator of alcohol 
impairment in your training and experience? 
! A. 
Q. 
Is that 
A. 
that's 
Q. 
-.-i . 
Yes. ! 
xAnd you also mentioned about the five second signal. 
an excessively long time for a signal? 
Generally we don't see a signal at all, but yeah, 
a very long time. 
would that indicate alcoholic impairment? 
Well, not necessarily, bun what it indicates to me 
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is they know they're being followed and they want to mak-
that I don't pull them over. I think that's usually the 
look at it. I'd been 
patrol four-and-a-hal: 
that carefully, and I' 
on patrol -- at that point I'd beei 
: years, and when I see somebody dr 
m already paying attention to them 
an obvious reason, then that definitely indicates to me 1 
something's going on. 
don't want me to stop 
That they know I'm there and that 
them. 
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Q. Okay, and based on what you observed, coupled with 
what you overheard on the radio, did you feel that the 
I defendant was impaired? 
A. Yeah, I did. 
with to have somebody 
that long, in my mind, 
coupled with the fact 
he was impaired, yes. 
I mean, it's suspicious enough to 
be driving that slow and signaling 
just because I'm following them. 
of what I heard over the radio, I 
MS. GOMEZ: Thank you, Officer. 
THE COURT: Mr. Schatz. 
EY MR. SCHATZ: 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
Q. So you're just out driving around and hear this 
come over the radio of dispatch saying that there was a 
driver who — did you 
information about who 
A. Yeah, it was 
have any details; did you get any 
made the complaint initially? 
- I heara or, ,he radio that ainpa 
begin 
for 
Then 
assumed 
call 
male 
.en axd 
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say that it was the ex-wife or wife calling; and she lived in 
Rose Park. I don't remember the address. 
Q. And did you receive any information that the two of 
them had been involved in sort of an ongoing custody dispute? 
A. I don't recall that in the report, but it could have 
been. Like I said, it wasn't really my call. It was just -- I 
just overheard it. 
Q. And you said that from what you recall, there was the 
description, of the vehicle as a red truck, but you weren't sure 
what the make was? 
A. I'm sure at the time I knew what the make was, because 
they had the plate and everything. They always put the plate 
and everything on the log, but at that time — now I can' t 
remember exactly what the plate or anything was, no. 
Q. Okay. Did you get any information about why this 
individual felt that — had reason to believe that he was 
intoxicated? Did they say that he stumbled and fell down the 
steps when he dropped the kids off? Was there any detail about 
why that individual was believed to be intoxicated? 
A. I den't know. 
Q. All you know is than his ex-wife had called in a 
report and said thai: he had dropped off the kids and she 
thought he might be intoxicated? 
:act with him at about Navaio Street and California? 
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Correct. 
And then at that point you turned around to follow 
A. Right. 
Q. And that's when you observed him -- two things. One 
is you said he was driving too slowly. Was he interfering with 
any traffic? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there people backed up behind him honking their 
horn or anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you required to drive the speed limit? • 
A. No. 
Q. Is it illegal not to drive the speed limit? 
A. It can be, yes. 
Q. It's illegal to go over the speed limit, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. But it's not illegal to go under the speed limit 
unless you're interfering with other traffic, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So he wasn't committing any sort of traffic violation 
by going 2 5 miles an hour in a 35 mile an hour zone? 
A. No. 
r ight , but t n a t was 5 tm_ susp ic ious to you'. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Ail right, and you said that he signaled for five 
seconds when changing lanes? 
A. Correct. 
Q. According to Utah code how long does a driver have to 
signal when making a lane change? 
A. Three seconds. 
Q. A. minimum of three seconds, correct? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Doesn't say you can't signal for lOxnger than that, 
does it? 
A. No. 
Q. And in fact, have you ever pulled somebody over for 
not signaling for three seconds? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How often? 
A. Not very often. Just if they're impeding traffic or 
about to cause an accident or something like that. 
Q. So if he wouldn't have signaled you would have pulled 
him over, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay, because that's a traffic violation; and you're 
saying the difference between three seconds and five seconds, 
when the statute savs a minimum of three seconds, you said than 
A. In my mind, yes. 
Q. I mean, how long does the average person signal in a 
3 lane change? 
4 A. About one second. 
5 Q. All right, but that would be illegal, then, right? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. And that would give you grounds to stop him? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. So in other words, he didn't violate the lane change 
10 statute, did he? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. So your reason for stopping him was based 
13 solely on this sort of undetailed report from an ex-wife, who 
14 for all you know, hated her husband's — ex-husband's guts and 
15 just wanted to try and get him in trouble? 
16 A. That's not the only reason I stopped him, no. I would 
17 have stopped him anyway, probably. 
18 Q. So if you would have observed him driving -- say if 
19 he'd have been driving 30 miles an hour instead of 25, and he'd 
20 only signaled for three seconds instead of five, would you 
21 still have pulled him over? 
22 A. I can't — I don't know. I don't know. Thau's not 
23 what happened. So I don't know. 
All right. Well, hypothex 
.iia L o 
what vou observed, wouic vou have still pu] 
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A. I can't really say. I dor/1 know. You have to --
every time, everything out there is different every time, so --
Q. Well, on this particular occasion -- let me ask you 
this. Did you take into account those two things as part of 
your reason for stopping? 
A. Yes. Oh, yes. 
Q. Okay, but absent those two things, you don't know if 
you'd have pulled him over or not, just based on that report 
you heard over dispatch? 
A. I might have pulled him over, just from the suspicion 
that he was intoxicated, because of the -- what we had over the 
radio. I might have stopped him anyway, yes. 
Q. Now, when you stopped him — how long had you followed 
him between when you first laid eyes on him until you finally 
turned your overhead lights on? 
A. It was two blocks. I turned my overhead lights on as 
we were turning southbound onto Emery. 
Q. Ail right, and during that two-block period did you 
observe him commit any illegal traffic violations at all? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you observe any equipment violations? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay, so he wasn't weaving? 
A. No. 
Q. This was — was this in the middle of the afternoon? 
- ? n -
^- It was evemnq. 
Q. Eve 
3 A. Yeah. 
4 Q. Okay. So he wasn't weaving. He wasn't speeding. He 
5 didn't run any stop signs? 
6 A. Mo. 
7 Q. He signaled all of his lane changes and turns? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. He didn't go into other lanes or anything like that? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Okay. So there was nothing about his driving pattern 
12 that violated any sort of traffic laws? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. And they were not typical of what you would think of 
15 an intoxicated driver, were they? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay, just because someone has been driving the speed 
13 limit? 
19 A. When somebody slows down when I get them behind them, 
2 0 and starts driving like that, yes, that usually is suspicious 
21 to me. 
22 Q. Do you find that when you're driving your vehicle, 
2 3 uhat the people around you tend to be more cautious when they 
24 know a oolice officer is foliowinq them? 
.autious, yes 
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Q. Okay. Nobody wants t o g e t a t i c k e r : , do t h e y ? 
A. No. 
Q. I mean - -
A. No. 
Q. Do you find yourself driving maybe a little under the 
speed limit when there's another officer around? 
A. No. 
Q. I guess maybe you don't have that feeling. 
A. No, I don't get that feeling. 
Q. Do you think people do that — 
A. Sure. 
Q. -- when they see other officers? 
A. (No verbal response). 
Q. So why would it be so abnormal when he saw you 
following him, to make sure he wasn't exceeding the speed 
limit? Isn't that what a driver is supposed to do? 
A. Most people will slow down to about the speed limit. 
They don't slow down ten miles an hour under the speed limit. 
Q. Okay, but you had no idea, I mean, exactly why he 
slowed down, did you? 
A. I had no idea, no. That's what's suspicious about it 
MR. SCHATZ: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Gomez. 
MS. GOMEZ: I have nothing else for the officer. 
THE COURT: Thank vou. You may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MS. GOMEZ: Your Honor, it seems clear here that there 
was reasonable suspicion to stop based on the totality of the 
circumstances. The officer had information from the dispatch 
that there was a drunk driver. I think that the case law 
clearly establishes even if the person hadn't known the person 
in the car, that once the officer comes and he is able to match 
the description of what the person called in, that that in 
itself is reasonable suspicion for the stop. 
Here the information he had that this was someone that 
knew the defendant. She had called and said that the person 
was drunk driving. Then when he sees the description matching 
the vehicle that was reported from the dispatch, he flips 
around in a U-turn and follows the vehicle. Then at that 
time he notices that the vehicle slows way down, ten miles an 
hour under the speed limit, and he also notices that he left 
his signal on for a long period of time. I think that those 
facts provide the officer with reasonable suspicion for the 
stop. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Schatz. 
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, what we have here is a 
completely undetailed sort of a blank, "Well, my husband 
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time, he made the decision and what he based his decision en. 
In this case all he's got is a report coming over 
dispatch from the alleged driver, the defendant's ex-wife. He 
doesn't have any information why she had reason to believe he 
was impaired. There was no detail given as to why she had any 
reason to think he had even been drinking. There's just this 
sort of blanket sort of vague argument, I guess, or complaint 
made that he was intoxicated. 
You know, for all the officer knew, they had just 
gotten in an argument over visitation, and she was just trying 
to do something to bother him or inconvenience him. So there 
was nothing behind that complaint that would have really given 
the officer good reason to believe he was impaired. 
Then when he pulled behind him, he observes what he 
thinks is the truck, and he says he verified it at the time 
with the license plate; but when asked specifically if he 
would have pulled the vehicle over absent these two suspicious 
driving patterns that he seems to indicate, he can't give us 
a definite answer. I think it's because the answer was he 
didn't think he had reason to pull them over just based on that 
dispatch alone. 
If we look at that those two added factors, I think 
they're irrelevant. Driving 25 miles an hour in a 35 mile 
an hour zone, there is absolutely nothing illeqal about that 
he'd have been going a mile over, he'd have been violating the 
law. So just because he was driving slow, that is not a crime. 
4 I That is not reasonable suspicion. 
5 It's only a crime if he's impeding traffic; and as 
6 the officer indicated, he wasn't blocking any traffic. There 
7 weren't cars backed up behind him. So that in and of itself is 
8 no reason to stop; and I don't think it necessarily adds that 
9 much to the first complaint. 
10 Second of all, for him to say that signaling for 
11 five seconds is an unusually long time I think is absolutely 
12 ridiculous. The statute says you have to signal for a minimum 
13 of three seconds. If I had a nickel for every time I had a 
14 client pulled over and arrested for DUI because he didn't 
15 signal for at least three seconds, I probably wouldn't have 
16 to be here today. He's saying that it was abnormal that he 
17 signaled for three seconds versus five. 
18 It's obvious that the officer was looking for any 
19 additional excuse to try to pull him over, and he latched onto 
20 these two things, which I don't think gives him any additional 
21 reason to pull him over, over and above what he had already 
22 had, which still didn't give him reasonable suspicion based 
23 on this alleged complaint that, you know, he didn't have any 
2 4 detail about. It was a very vaaue report at that point. 
iinly these two arivma patterns ne claims 
indicative of people who are imp^ 
to other sort of driving patte People who run stop signs, 
people who are weaving in their lane or even outside their 
lane. Those are the types of things that certainly are, first 
of all, traffic violations and would give an officer a reason 
6 to stop; but those are the sort of driving patterns that 
7 I much more indicative of someone who's impaired. 
During the two blocks that the officer followed 
9 him, he committed not a single traffic violation, nor did the 
10 I officer observe any sort of an equipment violation. So I think 
11 | under a totality of the circumstances, the officer was simpiy 
stretching to try to make a stop; and he stretched it too far, 
13 I based on the facts that he knew. Therefore there wasn't 
14 I reasonable suspicion, and any of the evidence he seized after 
15 the stop was illegally obtained. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. We'll be in recess for 
17 about five, maybe ten minutes. I'll be back with the decision. 
18 (Recess taken) 
19 I THE COURT: We're back on the record with Salt Lake 
10 | City vs. Tim Bench. I've went in and went over your arguments, 
and I realize that totality of the circumstances is kind of a 
catchall for a lot of this — please be seated -- but in my 
23 I mind there's clearly not enough evidence to stop — to pull 
Mr. Bench over based on his drivina pattern. 
mean, n it's not m e g a i , i n\€ you allow 
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this, then where do you stop pulling anybody over for anything? 
You're driving too legally, you know. I mean, absent some 
3 violation or some impairment -- I know that can be frustrating. 
4 I was behind a person driving 30 in a 35 today. I was a little 
5 irritated because I wanted to go 35 and I had somewhere to get 
6 to, but it's not illegal otherwise. 
7 So then there's the question of does the dispatch 
8 call make a difference? Does that broaden the umbrella? I 
9 think it does somewhat, but certainly not enough in this case. 
10 Therefore I'm granting the defendant's motion to suppress the 
11 stop. Find that there's not probable cause — sufficient 
12 probable cause to pull him over to make the traffic stop. 
13 So will you prepare the necessary findings and order 
14 on that. 
15 MR. SCHATZ: I will, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Then, given that, does the City know 
17 what it wants to do? 
18 MS. GOMEZ: Well, your Honor, I think we'd like to 
19 appeal, but I don't know what our appeal rights are. So I'll 
2 0 check into that. 
21 THE COURT: Well, okay, I can set it — I mean, just so 
22 that we don't lose track of it, I can set it on Judge — that's 
2 3 the problem, though. I don't know the answer to this; maybe 
2 4 you can help me. 
do know that on certa: *.?i^P^ . leionv cases, vcu 
have to have the Judge that has the file, you have to have --
precedence. If Judge Barrett were to hold a procedural rule on 
a procedural motion and then the case got shifted, I'd have to 
hear that again on a felony. I don't know if that's true on 
misdemeanors. Do either of you have any --
MR. GOMEZ: I don't, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Because this is shifting — 
MR. SCHATZ: I don't, your Honor. 
THE COURT: — this is shifting to Judge Fuchs as of 
July 1. So if there's an appeal, what I'm going to do is send 
it to Judge Fuchs on July 11th at 8:30. If for some reason it 
needs to come back for special attention from me at some point, 
I'm happy to take it back, but --
MR. SCHATZ: That was July 11th at what time, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: At 8:30. Thau's his next pretrial. Maybe 
the City will know by that time what it wants to do or will 
have done. 
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, I know that Mr. Bench 
obviously has to work. Since it's mainly going to be a 
decision for the City to decide how they wish to proceed, 
would the Court be willina to excuse his attendance an than 
MS. GOMEZ: What was that date, your Honor? 
THE COURT: July ll=h; and it's whether or not — 
MR. SCHATZ: If he doesn't appear, since we're not 
going to do anything — 
MS. GOMEZ: No. That's fine, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. 
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Schatz, as you prepare this, there's 
just too little in the dispatch to broaden that umbrella, is 
what I'm saying, in the dispatch call. 
MR. SCHATZ: So in essence you're saying that the — 
THE COURT: The breadth — 
MR. SCHATZ: — the lack of detail and description — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SCHATZ: — about why she believed he was impaired, 
left that call lacking in — 
THE COURT: Sure. I mean, there's just not enough 
information in the dispatch to the officer. 
MR. SCHATZ: So in other words, the information — 
THE COURT: Right:. 
MR. SCHATZ: — the officer had knowledge of at the 
ime. 
THE COURT: Coupled with the drivinq was not enoucrh 
the stop. 
MR. SCHATZ: Okav. I'll try to be detailed with 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
ADDENDUM B 
f mm mmmm mmt 
Third Judicial District 
Jason Schatz (Bar #9969) 
Schatz & Anderson, LLC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Phone (801) 746-0447 
Fax (801) 579-0606 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
Plaintiff, : DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
v. : CASE NO. 055900194 
Tim Bench, : 
Defendant. : JUDGE MAUGHAN 
The above entitled matter came before this court for hearing on the Defendant's Motion 
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represented by his attorney, Jason Schatz. 
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called one witness. Officer Justin Hudson. The defense did not present any witnesses. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
After having heard testimony from the City's witness and hearing argument from counsel 
for both parties, the court finds that: 
1. Officer Hudson was patrolling the Glendale area of Salt Lake City when he 
overheard a dispatch call indicating that a call had been received from a woman in 
the Rosepark area stating that her ex-husband may be dr4rving4tfideiUbeHmfh!eBce. 
According to Officer Hudson he recalled that the dispatch report described the 
vehicle in question as a red Dodge truck. Officer Hudson did not receive any 
further detail as to the complaint or information as to why the complaintant 
believed her ex-husband was intoxicated. Officer Hudson also heard the 
Defendant's home address. 
2. A short time later Officer Hudson observed a vehicle that he believed matched the 
description he overhead from dispatch. Officer Hudson observed the Defendant's 
truck driving near Navajo Street & California Ave. 
3. After observing the vehicle. Officer Hudson turned around to follow the vehicle. 
Officer Hudson then followed the vehicle for approximately two blocks before he 
attempted to stop the vehicle. During the two blocks that he followed the vehicle, 
he observed that the vehicle slowed to approximately 25 MPH and that the 
Defendant signaled for approximately 5 seconds before changing lanes. The 
posted speed limit in that area was 35 MPH. Officer Hudson did not observe that 
the Defendant was driving erratically or operating his vehicle in an unsafe manner 
nor did he observe any traffic or equipment violations. 
rff 
4. Officer Hudson initiated his overhead lights to stop the Defendant's vehicle at the 
approximate location of Emery Street. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact the court hereby makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Officer Hudson did not observe the Defendant commit any equipment or traffic 
violations that would justify him in stopping the Defendant's vehicle. Utah law requires 
that the driver obey the posted speed limit. Utah law prohibits a driver from driving at 
such a low speed that the driver is obstructing the reasonable flow of traffic. The 
Defendant was not committing a violation by driving only 25 MHP in a 35 MPH zone. 
Utah law requires that a driver signal his intention to make a lane change for at least 3 
seconds prior to making the lane change and that the lane change must be made with 
reasonable safety. Since the Defendant signaled for 5 seconds and he made the lane 
change in a safe and appropriate manner, the Defendant complied with the law regarding 
lane changes. 
2. The information obtained by Officer Hudson from the dispatch he overhead was 
not sufficient to justify a traffic stop on the Defendant's vehicle. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE after having fully considered the testimony of the witnesses, evidence, and 
the arguments presented, and based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth 
above. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Based on Lack of 
reasonable Suspicion to Initiate Traffic Stop is GRANTED. Therefore any information or 
3 
evidence obtained following the initial traffic stop of the Defendant's vehicle is hereby 
suppressed and excluded from trial in this matter. 
DATED this / ' day of _ . 2006. 
BY THE 
JUDGEMifi j^ANj -^ 
Third District^ Cntfrt 
i 
\ \ \ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this day. June 21. 2006.1 personally hand delivered or faxed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion 
to Dismiss Felony DUI to the following: 
Judge Maughan 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 S. State st. 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Bernadette Gomez 
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY 
349 S. 200 E., 5th floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tim Bench 
1417 Emery St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
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